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ON THECIVIL-NESS OFCIVILWAR:A
COMMENT ONDAVIDARMITAGE’SCIVIL
WAR TIME
MARY L. DUDZIAK*
It is a pleasure and an honor to comment on the work of David
Armitage, a historian of unparalleled reach and impact. His topic
could not be more important. “Civil war has gradually become the
most widespread, the most destructive, and the most characteristic
form of organized human violence,” he writes in his elegant and
masterful recent book Civil Wars: A History in Ideas.1 Examining the
history of the idea of “civil war” is not simply an academic
enterprise. Understanding its history, he explains, “reveals the
contingency of the phenomenon, contradicting those who claim its
permanence and durability.”2 Armitage’s purpose is “to show that
what humans have invented, they may yet dismantle . . . what
intellectual will has enshrined, an equal effort of imaginative
determination can dethrone.”3
Armitage’s illuminating Grotius Lecture generates a set of
questions about the relationship between armed conflict and what we
conceptualize as “civil” in war. He also critically reflects on how to
think about civil war in time.4 A conventional starting point for
temporal analysis of war is the idea that war breaks time into the
categories of “wartime” and “peacetime.” The initiation of war
thereby launches a society into a time period during which a normal
* Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
1. DAVIDARMITAGE, CIVILWARS: A HISTORY IN IDEAS 5 (2017).
2. Id. at 11.
3. Id.
4. David Armitage, Lloyd C. Blankfein Professor of History, Harvard Univ.,
Nineteenth Annual Grotius Lecture: Civil War Time: From Grotius to the Global
War on Terror, 111 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. (forthcoming 2017) (finding that
common views of the relationship between war and time are “deceptively
straightforward” and oversimplified).
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rule of law is suspended.5 In practice, however, starting and ending
points are fluid, and forms of time overlap. From this temporal
perspective, the importance of civil war’s time relates to when
international humanitarian law might apply. Civil war has another
temporality: its periodization. Armitage traces the way international
law initially excluded civil wars, but then incorporated them through
the concept of noninternational armed conflict.6
In this comment, I will expand on the idea of the “civil” in civil
war, focusing on the American Civil War experience and its
implications for later American wars. I will also consider the idea of
peace—usually imagined as existing outside of war—to understand
what peace might be in a world torn by violence.
The very idea of “civil war” breaks war into categories. Civil war
is interesting as a matter of intellectual history, as Armitage shows,
because it was an aberration from what were thought of as “normal”
or classic wars: interstate wars.7 Recognizing civil wars enables
Armitage to examine violence in the world during the post-1945
years—an era that some have called “the long peace.”8 George
Orwell anticipated that this era, shaped by the introduction of nuclear
arms, might be framed as peace.9 He argued that it would be “a peace
that is no peace,” a peace in name only.10 It is curious that persistent,
post-1945 violence might end up in categories that are other than
5. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS
CONSEQUENCES 11 (2012) (discussing the idea that wartime is a “state of
exception” where time is suspended and “rule of law . . . bends in favor of the
security of the state”).
6. Armitage, supra note 4 (noting that civil wars were not “valued” under
international law until after World War II when the Geneva Conventions were
revised in 1949).
7. Id. (discussing how the three-hundred-year span from 1648 to 1945 was
dominated by interstate wars, but after 1989 intrastate civil wars became the most
prevalent form of war).
8. ARMITAGE, supra note 1, at 3-4 (recalling the post–World War II period
characterized by enduring peace in Europe, North America, and wealthy countries
such as Australia and Japan).
9. See George Orwell, You and the Atomic Bomb, in FIFTY ORWELL ESSAYS
(2003) (ebook), at http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks03/0300011h.html#part33
(contemplating the idea that powerful nations might tacitly agree to refrain from
using atomic bombs against one another).
10. Id.
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“real war.” In that way peace may exist not through the absence of
violence but from the emptiness of one category: war’s ideal type, or
big, interstate war.
All violence in the world is not contained within these categories,
of course. The emergence of these categories in law enables certain
kinds of conflicts to be recognized, legitimized, and subject to rules,
making them appear to be contained within a rule of law, rather than
outside of law. If civil war was a new operative category of
legitimized war, what does the category leave out, and what are the
consequences? To think about this, I would like to take you back to
the 1860s when U.S. armed forces fought “the” Civil War and also
fought wars against Native Americans.
In the history of American wars, the Civil War is treated as
legitimate war not just because civil wars can be categorized as “real
war.” In American legal scholarship it instead became, in essence,
the classic American war—the war against which to compare all
others. In scholarship examining American war powers, the Civil
War is not treated as different from interstate wars but instead as one
of the most important examples of how American war powers work
in any context called war.11 It has received more attention in the legal
literature than has the Cold War, in spite of the fact that the Cold
War was the occasion for development of the modern national
security state—a governmental framework that continues to structure
the U.S. government’s war and security work.12 Structural
differences between a war within a polity and an international war
are sometimes lost in the process.
The history of the American Civil War illuminates the nature of
the “civil” in civil war. “To call a war ‘civil’ is to acknowledge the
11. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 3-26 (1998) (discussing civil liberties in wartime and
focusing most chapters on the example of the Civil War).
12. See Mary L. Dudziak, Toward a Geopolitics of the History of International
Law in the Supreme Court, 105 ASIL PROC. 532 (2011) (noting the great
overrepresentation of references to the Civil War, compared to very few references
to the Cold War, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S.
Dodge eds., 2011)). But see STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2013) (detailing the impact of the Cold War on presidential war
power).
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familiarity of the enemies as members of the same community,”
Armitage writes.13 They are “not foreigners but fellow citizens.”14
The principal character of the American Civil War’s civil-ness was
its constitutive character. It was not just that at the end of the war the
United States was preserved as a single country through defeat of the
Confederacy, and it was not just the abolition of slavery—though
both results were of great importance.15 The violence itself
constituted the polity in a new way. That idea is at the heart of an
especially important work on the American Civil War: Drew Gilpin
Faust’s “This Republic of Suffering:” Death and the American Civil
War.16 Enduring divisions survived the war, of course, but Faust
argues that the war’s carnage generated a shared cultural experience
and produced a broader public.17 The war’s carnage was so great—
over six hundred thousand military deaths—that the state and society
had to respond to it.18 Names had to be attached to the bodies and
then recorded and remembered. Families searched battlefields for
remains, disinterring the bones of others along the way.19
13. ARMITAGE, supra note 1, at 12.
14. Id.
15. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877 11-34 (1988) (noting that the American Civil War redrew the economic
and political map of both the North and South and accelerated the industrialization
of the North).
16. See DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR xiii (2008) (asserting that the United States was
transformed by the American Civil War as sacrifice and military struggle came to
define the nation and its purpose).
17. Id. at xv-xvi (arguing that the American Civil War created a “republic of
shared suffering” in which people in both the North and the South had experienced
sacrifice and loss). On the limits of postwar reconciliation, see CAROLINE E.
JANNEY, REMEMBERING THE CIVIL WAR: REUNION AND THE LIMITS OF
RECONCILIATION (2013).
18. See generally id. at 211-49 (highlighting the nation’s response to the loss,
including calls for society to not let the war-time deaths pass in vain, and to repay
the sacrifices of soldiers, be it collecting and burying bodies or caring for the
injured and survivors).
19. See id. at 61-136 (describing how the sheer scale of the death tolls after
battles in the American Civil War defied administrative predictions and capacity);
see also DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN
MEMORY 68 (2003) (noting the difficulty of interring the American Civil War’s
dead and specifically discussing how only one-third of the Union dead were
interred in identifiable graves after the Battle of Appomattox).
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The idea of a republic constituted through war death is perhaps
best illustrated by the quote in Faust’s title. It is from Frederick Law
Olmstead, who is most well known for his path-breaking landscape
architecture.20 Olmstead was still in search of a satisfying career path
when the Civil War broke out, and he was working on a hospital
transport ship. He noticed a sense of community among injured and
dying soldiers. They called out to each other and supported each
other, telling the staff to go and help another soldier who needed
them more urgently. The Civil War’s civil-ness—its constitutive
character— was on display on the hospital ship, though all around
were broken bones, open wounds, the dead and the dying.21 Suffering
produced a community, and in the nation as a whole Civil War death
was central to constituting a polity.22
The dead do cultural work for the living, historian Thomas
Laqueur argues.23 Politics exist within cultural contexts, so if the
dead do cultural work, they must also do political work. The political
work of the dead and their role in constituting a polity were on
display when Lincoln commemorated civil war dead at Gettysburg,
urging that the living were to be dedicated to uphold the principles
for which soldiers had given their lives.24
20. See FAUST, supra note 16, at xiii-xiv; see also FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED,
HOSPITAL TRANSPORTS 115 (1863) (describing the scene of wounded soldiers as a
“republic of suffering”).
21. See OLMSTED, supra note 20, at 115-18 (describing the community among
the wounded and dying soldiers on his hospital boat).
22. See FAUST, supra note 16, at xii-xiv (highlighting how the American Civil
War impacted national policy, such as the establishment of national cemeteries and
pensions, and created a sense of union and community through shared sacrifice);
see also BLIGHT, supra note 19, at 18 (citing Frederick Douglass’s argument that
the American Civil War would reorganize the country and bring about “national
regeneration”); MARK S. SCHANTZ, AWAITING THE HEAVENLY COUNTRY: CIVIL
WAR AND THE CULTURE OF DEATH 61-63 (2008) (illustrating how the American
Civil War was the first in American history where many young men died far from
home, and it resulted in a growing national belief in restoration, both bodily and
communally, in heaven).
23. See THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, THE WORK OF THE DEAD: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF MORTAL REMAINS 1-27 (2015) (arguing that the dead do “”cultural
work for the living).
24. See Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1986)
(urging that the living must carry out the unfinished work of the dead, ensuring that
the nation “shall have a new birth of freedom”); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Death
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During the Civil War, Lincoln commissioned Francis Lieber to
draft a code of war to set the legal boundaries of armed conflict.25 As
John Fabian Witt shows, the Lieber Code was intended not just as a
means to constrain war, but also as a tool to achieve Union aims.26
Armitage emphasizes Lieber’s ambivalence about how the American
conflict was best defined and how well it fit the new Code’s terms.27
Ultimately its political objective was most important. Lieber wrote:
“To save the country . . . is paramount to all other considerations.”28
All forms of political community were not protected by the Code,
however. It was intended as a code of civilized men, and its rule of
law was in service of civilization.29
Every political community has an outside. We can better
understand the nature of the Civil War’s civil-ness by examining the
outside of the Civil War–era polity.30 There was death and suffering
at the hands of American military forces in the 1860s that fell outside
of Faust’s republic of suffering.31 It helped to constitute that republic
nevertheless by showing its outside, and a border of “civilization”
between the deaths widely mourned and the others forgotten.32
and the War Power Y. J. L. & HUM., (forthcoming 2018) (developing further the
idea of the political work of the dead).
25. See ARMITAGE, supra note 1, at 183 (stating that the Lieber Code was the
first attempt to codify the laws of war).
26. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 1-4 (2012) (noting that the Lieber Code endorsed Emancipation in
addition to setting out rules for the treatment of enemy soldiers).
27. See ARMITAGE, supra note 1, at 163 (arguing that Lieber’s conception of
civil war was inapplicable to the conflict at hand, the American Civil War).
28. WITT, supra note 26, at 4.
29. See HELEN KINSELLA, THE IMAGE BEFORE THE WEAPON: A CRITICAL
HISTORY OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANT AND CIVILIAN, 82-83 (2011)
(explaining that there were mutually agreed limits on violence when it came to
civilians during the Civil War, but that such limits were not applied during the
U.S.-Indian wars).
30. FONER, supra note 15, at 590 (explaining that the most obvious fracture of
the post–Civil War polity was the continuing subjugation and disenfranchisement
of African Americans); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS
OFCITIZENSHIP INU.S. HISTORY 299 (1997).
31. See generally PETER COZZENS, THE EARTH IS WEEPING: THE EPIC STORY
OF THE INDIANWARS FOR THE AMERICANWEST (2016) (emphasizing the brutality
of American forces in the Indian Wars).
32. KINSELLA, supra note 29, at 96-97 (“The polyvalent dimensions of
civilization invoked—of civilized to savage, of civilized warfare against the
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This is illustrated by a rather brutal story from armed conflict in
Colorado in 1864. Norms were shifting regarding the protection or
the elimination of peaceful communities of Native Americans.33
Colorado Governor John Evans first told the Cheyenne and
Arapahoe that if they were loyal and peaceful, and if they registered
with his government, they would not be attacked but would be
protected.34 A Cheyenne village at Sand Creek took him up on his
offer. Two months later, however, Governor Evans changed his
mind.35 How, after all, could one tell between loyal and disloyal
Indians? As human beings, they were thought to be of a different
character than the white Northerners and Southerners fighting the
Civil War.36 They were the kind of barbarians that, thanks to the
Lieber Code, the Union Army could distinguish itself from through
honorable combat.37 The Code’s limits did not apply to conflict with
people thought of as savages. The Indian Wars were not treated like
the Civil War as battles between peoples for sovereignty—although
that is what, in part, they were. They were conceptualized by U.S.
military leaders as battles on behalf of civilization against the savage
threat.38 Lieber himself wrote in 1863: “Protection was, and still is,
with uncivilized peoples, the exception.”39
Before American troops descended on the peaceful village at Sand
Creek, Colonel John Chivington told his men to “‘kill and scalp all,
little and big,’ for ‘nits make lice.’”40 The result was an orgy of
violence. Women were not spared but were raped and chopped into
pieces. Babies were shot at point blank range. The Cheyenne at Sand
Creek were brutally eliminated in the name of upholding
warfare of savages, and of civilized men against savages—censured the military
while simultaneously upholding the differences between civilized Christian men
and the savages they desired to mutilate.”).
33. Id. at 97-99.
34. Id. at 98.
35. Id. at 99.
36. Id. at 101-02.
37. Id. at 96-97.
38. KINSELLA, supra note 29, at 97.
39. See id. at 82; see also Clara Altman, Courtroom Colonialism: Philippine
Law and U.S. Rule, 1898-1935 87 (Aug. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Brandeis University) (detailing the way protections of the law of war were not
extended to Filipinos thought of as “savages”).
40. KINSELLA, supra note 29, at 99.
342 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [33:2
civilization.41
There was no Gettysburg address delivered at Sand Creek. This
was not only because the casualties were Native Americans rather
than U.S. military. This was not a sacrifice shared through mourning
that transcended political boundaries.42 The entire point was an
exclusion from the polity, after all. The logic of murdering babies
was to perpetuate the excision across generations.43 Sand Creek is
remembered and mourned by Native Americans.44 Otherwise, it
remains at the boundary of American memory.45 Unlike the Civil
War’s generative political character, the Indian Wars more often
constitute American political identity through their exclusion.
The point of telling this story is not to show that the code of war
the Civil War produced did not end atrocity, for of course it could
not do that. Instead, the story shows the borders of the civic
community and civil society that the Civil War’s fighters and
commanders thought the war was about. Community was borne out
of the war’s carnage, as Faust argues, but the republic of suffering
had an outside, a border between the deaths to be mourned and those
to be forgotten.46 This brings a ragged edge to the civil-ness of the
American Civil War. It also sheds an important light on the character
of the kind of “peace” we might find in its aftermath.
If—drawing from Faust and Laqueur—death in war has a politics,
and if the polity has been shaped by the shared experience of
suffering and death, what happens to the polity when war is far away
and a warring people do not themselves suffer? Can Kant’s peace,
which Professor Armitage hopes for, exist in a world where the
United States can go to war without most Americans experiencing
any suffering?47
41. Id. at 99-101.
42. See ARI KELMAN, A MISPLACED MASSACRE: STRUGGLING OVER THE
MEMORY OF SAND CREEK 31 (2013).
43. KINSELLA, supra note 29, at 99-101.
44. See KELMAN, supra note 42, at 93-98.
45. Id.
46. FAUST, supra note 16 (discussing a “republic of suffering” among
Northerners and Southernors, but not discussiong Native American deaths).
47. See generally Dudziak, supra note 25 (examining the impact of physical
distance on American war politics).
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If there has been a “long peace” since 1945, as some have argued,
for whom has this “peace” existed? Not for those killed in battles
between armed troops, those living in carpet-bombed territory, or
those whose farms and villages were napalmed.48 Nowadays, the
precision of contemporary weapons does not produce more peace
simply because the blast radius from a drone strike can be smaller.
The sound of the drone has become part of the ambient environment
in some parts of the world—a world now shaped by the watchful eye
of surveillance and, in some regimes, an ever-present threat of
annihilation.49 When military ordinance encounters the human body,
the categorization of resulting death as lawful “collateral damage”
matters only to those left to categorize. The dead body can be argued
about but cannot itself complain.
We might, along with Armitage, long for Kant’s idea of a
perpetual peace, but in the twenty-first century world, peace is not a
time. There is no widely shared “peacetime,” especially for the
United States, which is engaged in endless armed conflict.50 Instead,
peace is an identity for those peoples privileged to experience it.51
For most Americans, peace exists as an absence of
conceptualization. Leaving war fighting to others, and far from the
48. See JOHN TIRMAN, THE DEATHS OF OTHERS: THE FATE OF CIVILIANS IN
AMERICA’S WARS 3-5 (2012); Yuki Tanaka, Introduction, in BOMBING CIVILIANS:
A TWENTIETH-CENTURY HISTORY 4-7 (Yuki Tanaka & Marilyn B. Young eds.,
2009).
49. See Nasser Hussain, The Sound of Terror: Phenomenology of a Drone
Strike, BOSTON REVIEW, October 16, 2013, available at
http://bostonreview.net/world/hussain-drone-phenomenolog); SCOTT SHANE,
OBJECTIVE TROY: A TERRORIST, A PRESIDENT, AND THE RISE OF THE DRONE 6
(2015); UNDER THE DRONES: MODERN LIVES IN THE AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN
BORDERLANDS (Shahzad Bashir & Robert D. Crews eds., 2012) (discussing the
regions affected by drone warfare).
50. See ANDREWBACEVICH, Introduction, in THE LONGWAR: A NEWHISTORY
OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 4 (Bacevich ed.,
2007); ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY
BECAME EVERYTHING (2016) (discussing ongoing U.S. armed conflict); Marilyn
B. Young, “I Was Thinking, as I Often Do These Days, of War”: The United States
in the First Century, 36 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 1 (2012) (noting the way U.S. war is
continuous and comes to be normalized).
51. Mary Dudziak, War and Peace in Time and Space, 13 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 381 (2015) (arguing that the persistence of conflicts means that the
experience of “peace” depends on class, race, and location).
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battlefield, it rarely crosses their minds52—unless a particularly
disturbing photograph of dead children appears in their social media.
They might tweet in outrage and be satisfied to have had their say.53
There is an absence of the collective suffering that Olmsted
encountered on the hospital transport ship and that Faust argued
helped shape the United States in war’s aftermath.
The American Civil War would become “the test case for the
legitimacy of secessionist civil war everywhere,” Professor Armitage
writes.54 It would not, however, be the defining model for other
conflicts between the American whole and its parts, like the Filipinos
who sought independence after the Spanish-American War, but
instead fought American occupiers.55 The Philippine-American War
was a conflict not only excluded from the panoply of great wars but
also from American memory itself, as wartime for Filipinos came to
be remembered as an American “peacetime.”56 This shows that
peace, at its core, is not a time, but a failure of memory.
Perhaps the peace we seek should be experienced more
expansively, as the suffering of the Civil War was. We know that
violence and its aftereffects can draw people together. If only a
political community could be constituted in relation to peacefulness
rather than violence.
52. See Pew Research Center, The Military Civilian Gap: Fewer Family
Connections, PEW SOCIAL TRENDS (Nov. 23, 2011), at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/23/the-military-civilian-gap-fewer-
family-connections/#fnref-9923-1.
53. See Rick Gladstone, Report Confirms That Chemical Arms Were Used on
Syrian Villagers, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/world/middleeast/syria-sarin-chemical-
weapons-united-nations.html (noting worldwide revulsion to images of dead
Syrian children); see also SUSAN SONTAG, REGARDING THE PAIN OFOTHERS 14-17
(2003) (discussing the experience of viewing photographs of catastrophes).
54. ARMITAGE, supra note 1, at 166.
55. See PAUL A. KRAMER, BLOOD OF GOVERNMENT: RACE, EMPIRE, THE
UNITED STATES, AND THE PHILIPPINES (2006) (describing the brutal U.S. war
against Philippine independence fighters).
56. DUDZIAK, supra note 5, at 28.
